Unlike outside investors, controlling groups have the option to trade on inside information, and can exercise it at the expense of the former. We compute informed trading probabilities (ITP) for the universe of liquid stocks from seven Latin American countries, trading both at home and as ADRs, and apply them to address corporate governance questions. We find substantial heterogeneity of ITP within a given institutional environment. Nevertheless, we can identify significant differences in mean ITP across volume ranges, countries, and security types. ITP has an intuitively appealing correlation with some (but not all) of the country-wide investor protection variables used in the literature. We find significant increases in ITP just before public corporate announcements, as if privately-informed agents were exploiting their privilege when it is most valuable. ITP is priced in the market: companies with higher ITPs fetch lower Tobin's qs. We conclude that Informed Trading Probability proxies for unobservable corporate governance quality as the heterogeneity of firm behavior seems to be recognized by the market and priced accordingly.
Introduction
When illegal insider trading goes unpunished, as in most countries in Latin America, controlling groups can periodically confiscate minority shareholders in a politically low-cost way by using their privileged access to information to trade on it (Maug, 2002 , Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson, and Kehr, 2000 , Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002 , Beny,1999 . The expected probability that outside investors will be confiscated through cheap governance and informed trading is a crucial determinant of their portfolio allocation and the ensuing cost of capital for the corporations trying to raise it.
But, how prevalent is insider trading in Latin America, and to what extent is it connected to corporate governance? All the questionnaires that form the basis of the known corporate governance ratings include sections related to fair and timely disclosure of information to the market.
1 But aside from the analyst's judgement of the corporation's common practice, we lack an independent, objective, quantitative, and theory-based assessment of the extent to which informed trading effectively takes place. This paper provides such estimates for the universe of liquid stocks from Latin America. It then uses them both as an explained and as an explanatory variable in regression analysis.
Is informed trading a deterministic function of corporate and country-wide institutional controls used in the literature, or does it provide substantial additional information? What corporate observables are more likely to be correlated with higher informed trading intensity? In the time-series dimension, does informed trading peak some time before material corporate announcements are disclosed to the market, or is it flat and close to zero throughout the sample? Moreover, could estimated informed trading intensity help explain corporate valuations above and beyond country-wide institutional variables used in the literature? Would it also be a better measure, in this sense, than analyst-based rankings intended to measure governance quality? From Klapper and Love (2002) and La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) we know that the market "prices" the quality of corporate governance. However, do markets charge a premium for informed trading above and beyond the punishment for bad governance?
We address these questions using high-quality, ultra-high-frequency data from Bloomberg comprising over 80 million records of individual transactions and best offer quotes from October 2, 2003 , until September 29, 2004 We use the framework of Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1996a , 1997a , 1997b , and jointly with Paperman (1996b) to estimate the informed trading probability (ITP hereafter) for each individual stock at various points throughout the sample. To our knowledge, this is the only method that allows direct estimation of how likely it is that each observed transaction comes from a privately informed party. This method contrasts with others in the literature (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981 , John and Lang, 1991 , Meulbroek, 1992 , Cornell and Sirri, 1992 , and Estrada and Peña, 2002 that only provide an indirect methodology to infer informed trading and is better suited for countries where insider trading prosecutions are rare. It is noteworthy that the method that we adopt estimates the intensity of privately informed trading, a category that includes but is not limited to illegal insider trading. Legal private information trading includes acting on the basis of analysts reports, proprietary industry or macro forecasts, etc.
In related work, Grishchenko, Litov, and Mei (2002) use a test based on the theoretical model of Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) to estimate informed trading in 19 Emerging markets from almost seven years of daily closing price and volume data. According to the model, the higher the correlation between lagged volume times lagged return and current return, the higher is the intensity of privately informed trading. Grishchenko et al. find that for 14 percent of the firms in their sample, the coefficient is statistically significant.
2 Although we do not know of a formal way to evaluate whether the Easley et al. or the Llorente et al. method is better, our proposed method seems more powerful. For example, Grishchenko et al.'s method would not detect informed trading if markets were weakly efficient at daily intervals. In this case, however, our focus on transaction by transaction data could still detect it. In the model we adopt, it is the composition of buying and selling orders and no trade intervals within the day, and not the return data, that tells us whether some agents are more informed than others.
Key findings are as follows: there is substantial heterogeneity of ITP across stocks and this dispersion occurs mainly within groups (such as countries, volume quintiles, industrial sectors, security types, and ADR classifications) and not between them. In spite of this, some effects are apparent: ITP is much higher the lower the liquidity of stocks, Brazil and Mexico have lower mean ITP, while Colombia and Venezuela have higher mean ITP than the average stock. Importantly, the stocks of firms with ADR programs have less ITP than those without, and countries with better information-related investor protection legal variables tend to have lower ITP.
We next analyze if ITP peaks just before material corporate announcements are disclosed to the market, and find that this is true in general, although the magnitude and the lead of the anticipation seems higher for acquisition and divestiture announcements than for earnings and cash-dividend announcements. We find palpable information leakage in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, but no evidence thereof in Brazil. Investors might care to know that some industrial sectors are subject to significant spikes of ITP just before public announcements.
Last, we find that the market recognizes in part the heterogeneity of ITP across firms and over time: a fall of one standard deviation in ITP raises Tobin's q by about one to two percentage points.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the hypotheses tested in the paper, and section 3 describes the informed trading estimation method. Section 4 describes the data sources and sample construction, and section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes, analyzes the policy implications of our findings and highlights directions for future research. The appendix reports the liquidity characteristics of our sample, it describes the corporate announcements data and the investor protection variables used in the paper, and also presents the results of a robustness check for the event study.
Testable Hypotheses
The theme of this paper is that, given the unobservability of illegal insider trading, its detrimental effect on minority shareholders' returns, and the history of impunity of this fraud in Latin America, controlling groups can actually choose by how much they will exploit their informational advantage in securities trading. 3 This gives room for heterogeneity of informed trading behavior across stocks subject to the same institutional or technological environment (e.g. nationality, industry, etc.). Moreover, controlling groups could signal to the market that they will abstain from exploiting their informational advantage and the market could react to this signal by assigning higher valuations.
Controlling group discretionary powers could hurt minority shareholders, but they could also benefit them. For instance, a more powerful controlling group may internalize benefits of monitoring that are beneficial to all shareholders, or they could react more effectively to unexpected changes in the economic environment. However, insider trading is an explicit use of the discretion option that is harmful to outside investors. The presence of nationwide regulations reflects that controlling groups have options to harm. Insider trading proxies indicate to what extent controlling groups actually exercise these options at the expense of outsiders.
We propose three sets of hypotheses tests. In the first set, we try to assess the degree of heterogeneity of firm behavior regarding insider trading activity within a given institutional environment and the cross-sectional covariates of informed trading probability. Also, if corporations use the listing of ADRs as a signal to convey to the market a more fair treatment of inside information, then those corporations that do not list abroad will have a higher ITP. Further, we test if ITP is related to the investor protection or legal environment variables used in the literature to proxy for corporate governance quality. The maintained hypothesis is that this new measure of governance quality contains more information than previously used measures.
In the second set of tests we focus on the time pattern of ITP around material corporate announcements. If insiders are indeed exploiting their informational advantage, ITP should peak just before those announcements. We also analyze whether the quantitative importance of this effect depends upon firm's observable characteristics.
The first set of tests, documents that there is substantial heterogeneity of privately informed trading within countries, investor protection environments, and over time. The third and final set of tests assesses to what extent does the market recognize this heterogeneity. If so, when companies manage to reduce their ITP levels, the market should respond with higher valuations.
We test this hypothesis by expressing the market value regression in La Porta et al. (2002) in panel form and adding each firm's quarterly ITP to it.
An important recent literature pioneered by La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, among others, has estimated how the quality of the nationwide investor protection environment affects the cost and availability of outside financing for corporate investment. We intend to take this literature one step further by following the lead of Klapper and Love (2002) and Grishchenko et al. (2002) in analyzing whether there is significant heterogeneity of controlling group behavior within a given institutional environment, and to what extent does the market recognize this. Klapper and Love (2002) find that individual corporate governance quality is priced above and beyond country-wide controls. However their estimates rely on CLSA's governance quality ratings, an analyst-based and therefore potentially subjective or endogenous measure. Moreover, since these ratings are fixed over time, they cannot compute the market valuation response to a given corporation's change in governance quality. By the same token, they can not compute if information-based trading peaks before public announcements like we do. Grishchenko et al. (2002) also precedes our paper. Unlike our procedure, their method would not detect informed trading if markets are weakly efficient at daily intervals.
4 Moreover, they do not compute to what extent market valuations respond to different ratings of corporate governance quality, like Klapper and Love (2002) and we do.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first study to provide objective, quantitative, and theorybased assessments of the probability of informed trading using ultra high frequency data and to use these to address corporate governance questions.
Estimation of the Informed Trading Probability

Methodological Review
We estimate the informed trading probability (ITP) using the discrete time theoretical framework developed by Easley and O'Hara (1987, 1992) and implemented in several applications for US markets by Easley, O'Hara, and co-authors (1996a , 1996b , 1997a , 1997b , 2002 . To the best of our knowledge, this is the only theoretical model that generates a structural equation that allows direct estimation of the probability of privately informed trading. This section briefly surveys its basic elements.
The basic intuition behind the model is that sudden increases in the gap between buy and sell orders (i.e. order imbalance) may be associated with more active participation by informed parties resulting from the arrival of private information. In the model, once informed parties observe a signal, they always trade as long as they can extract a rent. If trading is not caused by private information, one would expect a more stable and balanced flow of buy and sell orders.
More formally, the model considers that a signal that is perfectly correlated with the value of the asset may be realized before the beginning of the trading day. The true value of the asset will be publicly known only at the end of the day. Both the signal and the value of the firm may take only two realizations, either high or low. However there may be days with no signal realization at all. The trading day is divided into many discrete time periods. The asset is traded in a market with competitive market makers. Agents execute all buying and selling orders from investors at prices quoted by the market makers. There are two types of investors. Privately informed traders (or insiders) know the realization of the signal. Liquidity or noise traders may buy or sell for reasons other than information. Investors and market makers are assumed to be risk neutral.
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There may also be no trade in some periods.
Transactions take place sequentially, over the many time periods comprised in one day, as illustrated in Figure 1 . In every period, nature chooses only one trader to place an order. If nature chooses an informed trader (which happens with probability µ), this agent buys (if the signal indicated a high value) or sells (if the signal indicated a low value) one unit of the asset.
6 Nature chooses a noise trader with the remaining probability (1-µ). This agent may either trade with probability ε, or not trade. If she trades, she sells one unit with probability ρ and buys with the remaining probability 1-ρ.
In equilibrium, given perfect competition across market makers, they set bid and ask quotes equal to the expected value of the asset conditional on either a sell or a buy, respectively. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) have shown that these are, indeed, the optimal quote policies by these market makers. Thus, each market maker extracts information from the order flow. Both Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1992) have shown that, if all probabilities are bounded in (0,1), the effective market price converges in probability to the true value of the firm by the end of the trading day.
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE) While µ is the informed trading probability conditional on the existence of private information, our object of interest is the probability that a given observed trade is generated by an informed investor, i.e., the probability that, conditional on a trade, that trade comes from an informed investor. This equals the probability of observing an informed trade divided by the total probability of observing a trade, be it informed or uninformed,
This probability depends on α (the probability that an information event takes place), on µ (the joint probability of a trade and that the trade comes from an informed investor, given that an information occurs), and on ε (the probability that an uninformed investor decides to trade when nature chooses him). For given α and µ, the greater is the propensity of the uninformed investor to trade ε, the lower should be the probability that a given trade comes from an informed investor.
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In the model, the number of trades is ex-ante random. For illustration, the last column of Figure 1 shows the probability that we observe 5 buys, 4 sells, and 1 no-trade period in one day given three different scenarios: there is bad (private) information, there is good (private) information, or there is no new (private) information. The unconditional probability of observing 5 buys, 4 sells and 1 no-trade period during that day is just the weighted average of these three probabilities, the weights being the probabilities of observing bad information (αδ), good information (α(1-δ)), and no information (1-α). Generalizing this allows us to write the probability of observing a given amount of B buys, S sells, and N no trades as,
where
, and
Equation (2) shows the likelihood of observing a trade pattern during a given day. In order to estimate the model's parameters, the literature assumes that these are fixed during a period of time, and that the number of daily buys, sells, and no-trades observed during that period are a random sample from this distribution. 8 With these assumptions, the problem reduces to maximizing the log likelihood,
The solution to this maximization problem provides the parameter estimates used to compute ITP in (1).
Does Informed Trading
Probability really measure what we want to measure?
As described above, the ITP estimation procedure relies exclusively on the observed pattern of buys, sells, and no-trades. Such pattern, however, may result from factors other than private information, such as market humor, pure heterogeneous beliefs, etc. In this section, we argue why we think that ITP is a good measure of the intensity of privately informed trading by surveying several results in the literature that indirectly validate it. Alternative measures of asymmetric information in stock markets include the bid-ask spread, the adverse selection component of the spread, the price impact of trades and volume.
A vast brand of the literature relies on the bid-ask spread to proxy for the degree of asymmetric information, including the framework we use here (see Glosten and Milgrom, 1985 , Kyle, 1985 , Easley and O'Hara, 1987 , for a theoretical analysis of this relationship). The idea is that the higher the degree of asymmetric information, the higher is the adverse selection cost both for uninformed investors and dealers and so the larger is the spread. A number of recent empirical papers show a positive correlation between the spread and ITP. For example, OddersWhite and Ready (2004) use the 3,000 largest capitalization firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during 24 calendar quarters between January 1995 and December 2000 and find a correlation between the relative quoted spread (spread divided by price) and ITP of 0.35. Using a sample of 5,500 firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from the fourth quarter of 1997 and the fourth quarter of 1998, Dennis and Weston (2001) estimate this coefficient to be 0.33. Finally, Vega (2004) estimates both spreads and ITPs for 1,461 stocks listed on the NYSE between January 1986 and December 2001, and finds a correlation of 0.19. In all the cases, the correlation coefficients are statistically significant at a 5 percent level or better.
On the other hand, Hasbrouck (1991) postulates that a higher price change (controlling for volume) reflects the presence of more private information. Both Odders- White and Ready (2004) and Dennis and Weston (2001) found this correlation to be strictly positive and statistically significant. Finally, Wang (1994) , among others, argues theoretically that information asymmetry and volume are negatively correlated. Brown, Finn and Hillegeist (2001) find a correlation of -0.45 between ITP and share volume using data from more than 230 firms listed on the NYSE, while Straser's (2002) coefficient is almost identical (-0.46 ). While ITP is not free from some criticisms, the above results suggest that ITP points in the same direction as other asymmetric information measures commonly used in the literature. 9 Moreover, it has the advantage that it explicitly attempts to measure our object of interest.
It is noteworthy that not all privately informed trading is insider trading, as it could be based on carefully processed public information (e.g. analysts' reports). Aslan (2004) studies the behavior of ITP before and after the introduction of the Fair Disclosure Regulation in 2000 for a sample of more than 1,500 NYSE stocks. She finds that, for medium and large size stocks, the ITP fell after the regulation, which is what should occur if ITP really measures informed trading intensity. However she also finds that ITP increased for small-size stocks after the regulation. To solve this puzzle, she uses Wang's (1998) model to discriminate informed trading between pure information asymmetry and heterogeneity of beliefs. She concludes that the increase in ITP for small-size stocks can be explained by an increase in diversity of beliefs. This suggests that informed trading (measured by ITP but also by the other proxies) is also related to investors and analysts who can better interpret publicly available information than other traders.
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This broader interpretation of informed trading actually states that not only the quantity of public information matters, but also its quality. Aslan's (2004) result suggests that, for small-size stocks, the publicly available information after the regulatory change lacked enough precision to be rightly interpreted by all market participants. Moreover, Brown et al. (2001) find that ITP is negatively correlated with the AIMR Score, a proxy for the quality of publicly disclosed information. Despite the caveats of using only one proxy of the disclosure quality, this illustrates the idea that firms with better corporate governance practices (that include better publicly disclosed information) should have a lower ITP.
Data Sources and Sample Construction
Stock Data
9 To the best of our knowledge, Aktas et al. (2004) provide the strongest criticism of the Easley and O'Hara (1987, 1992) measure of informed trading. These authors compute ITP for a sample of 87 French companies listed on the Paris Bourse around merger and acquisition announcements that took place between 1995 and 2000, and find that that ITP drops in periods previous to the public announcement date relative to a control and post-announcement window. (Here the control window comprises the period of between 270 and 181 days previous to each announcement, the remote pre-announcement period includes the period of between 180 and 66 days before the announcement, the near pre-announcement period goes from 65 to 6 days previous to the announcement, while the post-announcement period goes from 3 to 63 days after the announcement). 10 Note that analysts can in principle study a wide cross section of firms, but insiders will only know about their own. In the empirical analysis, we use sector, country or stock-specific controls to remove some of the informed analyst effects that are constant across stocks or over time.
We take the universe of stocks and ADRs from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela, a total of more than 1,400 tickers from about 1,000 corporations.
11 For each ticker we multiply the total volume traded in US dollars by the fraction of days during which it traded, both using data from the 43 weekdays between October 2, and November 29, 2003. We rank all stocks in decreasing order of this liquidity index and we obtain intraday data from Bloomberg for the top 602 ranked tickers for the period between October 2, 2003 , until September 30, 2004 . The specific variables are ticker, exchange, time (hour, minute, and second), price, and volume of each transaction. For most markets we also obtain data on the best offers and their changes prevailing at each point in time during the course of trading: time, highest bid price, total volume offered at highest bid price, lowest ask price, and total volume offered at lowest ask price. 12 In total, we process about 80 million records of individual transactions and offers. We focus on all non-condition-coded transactions that take place between one half hour after the official opening of each market and the close of that market.
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About one half of the 602 stocks traded during less than three out of five days during the sample period. So we focus on a subset composed of the 288 most liquid tickers pertaining to 207 corporations.
14 We restrict the sample in this way in order to reduce the possibility of making faulty inferences induced by imprecisely estimated ITPs.
The Appendix analyzes the liquidity characteristics of these 288 tickers during the sample period. Most of the stocks in the sample are from Brazil and Mexico, which account for almost 87 percent of the region's trading. Chile, Argentina, and Peru account for about 12 percent of trading, while Colombia and Venezuela make up the remaining one percent (see Table A1 ). For the region as a whole, there is about as much trading in the ADR market as there is at home.
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Table A2 looks at the industrial sector breakdown of the tickers by country, while tables A3 and A4 analyze the distribution of liquidity in this sample. Table A5 analyzes the distribution of traded volume by quintiles.
While every transaction involves a purchase by one party and a sale by another party, we focus on which action actually triggered the transaction in order to declare it as a buy or as a sell. To do this, we follow Lee and Ready (1991) to classify each transaction as seller-initiated or buyer-initiated. For a trade observed at the ask (bid) price, this method classifies it as a buy (sell). For a trade above (below) the midpoint of the bid-ask spread the method classifies it as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated). 16 For each day in the sample, we compute the number of buys, 11 Hereafter, we will use stock and ticker as synonyms: both refer to a unique security-exchange combination. Note that an ADR and its underlying stock have different tickers, just like the preferred and common stock of the same corporation. 12 The bid and ask prices are used to facilitate identifying transactions as buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. The bid and ask volumes are helpful to identify possible measurement error of transaction volume. We lack offer data for Colombia and for ADRs. 13 Transaction records flagged with condition codes are unusual in some sense (e.g. they pertain to the official closing price of a market (which is not a real trade), or they pertain to a trade that is subject to non-standard delivery terms). 14 Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the number of firms that have more than one ticker by category of stocks. 15 The exceptions are Peru and Venezuela for which there is about 5.5 and 1.8 times as much trading in the US as there is at home. The bottom panel of With these data in hand, we estimate the parameters of the model by maximum likelihood using the Newton-Raphson algorithm on a fine grid.
17 Easley et al. (1996a Easley et al. ( , 1996b Easley et al. ( , 1997a Easley et al. ( , 1997b ) proceed in this way to estimate the parameters using data from periods that range between six and twelve weeks. We estimate equation (3) for each calendar quarter in the sample for these 288 tickers. With those estimates, we use equation (1) to compute the ITPs, which provide the basis for all our empirical tests except for the event study. 
Country Data
We follow the literature in using several measures of the quality of the nationwide investor protection environment. (1998) and ICRG. We also use a second reading of this index using the updated arguments from ICRG (2004). The seven countries in our sample have regulations banning illegal insider trading according to Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) , from whom we borrow the Insider Trading Enforcement dummy. This variable equals one if at least one person had been prosecuted under these laws as of March, 1999, and it is zero otherwise. Mexico stands out as a paradigmatic case of non-enforcement: although it banned illegal insider trading in 1975, nobody had ever been prosecuted by the end of the century.
Corporate Announcements Data
that was different from that given trade's price. Since this criterion proves to be very precise relative to the case with offer data, we just rely on transaction data for Colombia and the US. When offer data are available but the trade price is exactly at the midpoint of the spread Lee and Ready suggest using the tick test. 17 The estimation procedure comprises a possibly non-concave optimization problem because the expression inside the logs is of the form f(ψ) X , where X is greater than one (X is the number of buys, sells, or no trade periods). These functions are strictly convex for X>1. Even if applying the natural log to these functions, the convexity may still remain. As standard in this literature, we take care of possible multiple local maxima using each grid point as the initial value of the algorithm, and then choosing the highest among the local maxima attained from each starting point. 18 The model could not be estimated for some ticker-quarters. This may be due to sudden drops in the liquidity of a security (including outright delisting), or to convergence failure of the algorithm. Therefore, the number of tickerquarters (N) in the first column of Table 1 .A is not necessarily a multiple of four.
The comprehensive list of corporate announcements used for the event study is from Bloomberg. We consider four types of announcements: acquisitions, divestitures, cash dividends, and earnings announcements, which make up the majority of public statements by firms. The Appendix describes the announcement data in detail.
It is possible that there are different patterns of informed trading before periodic announcements than before non-periodic or aperiodic announcements. On the one hand, the market knows that a corporation will announce earnings about six weeks after the end of the quarter. While in an ideal world the magnitude of the earnings figure is secret, the frequency of the release is approximately common knowledge. The situation differs for aperiodic announcements. In an ideal world, not only their content is secret, but also the frequency of their public release. So we conjecture that the ratio of illegally over legally privately informed trades is higher before aperiodic announcements than before periodic announcements. Therefore, we classify Earnings and Cash Dividends announcements as periodic, and Acquisition and Divestiture announcements as aperiodic, and compute potentially different event effects for each type. The total number of announcements during this period for all the exchanges in the sample is 1,310. There are eight stocks in the 288-ticker sample that did not release any announcements during the announcement sample. There are 14 stocks from Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia, which made 58 announcements in total; we exclude them to avoid making inference about country effects based on too small a sample. We are left with 266 tickers, which made a total of 1,252 announcements. Further, the algorithm did not converge in estimating equation (3) for two other stocks that had made a total of five announcements. Therefore, we run the event study on 1,247 announcements from 264 stocks. Table A8 in the Appendix shows a breakdown of these announcements by type and exchange, industrial sector, security type, ADR status and volume quintiles. Figures A2 and A3 in the Appendix plot the frequency over time by type of announcement and by country. About 90 percent of announcements pertain to Earnings and Cash Dividends with the remaining percentage corresponding to Acquisitions and Divestitures. The average ticker made about 4.7 announcements during the sample period.
Firm-Specific Variables
Country, industrial sector, whether the stock is classified as common or preferred, and its ADR status are from Bloomberg. Some researchers (e.g. Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005) argue that Brazilian preferred stocks (e.g. PN, PA, or PB shares) are in fact non-voting common stocks with no material dividend payments. They and others (e.g. Carvalho, 2000) find that control in Brazilian corporations is so concentrated that controlling groups can easily divert net income away from outside shareholders. While we stick to the Bloomberg classification, we use the terms "preferred" and "non-voting" shares as synonyms since the only such stocks in the 288 ticker sample are from Brazil. Note that ADR and Common/Preferred status are independent groupings. ADR tickers were classified as common or preferred stocks based on what was the case for each ADR's underlying security. The ADR classification admits four mutually excluding and exhausting categories: either the ticker corresponds to an ADR, or it corresponds to an ADR underlying security, or it corresponds to a company that has an ADR program, although this ticker itself is neither the ADR nor the underlying, or finally the ticker is from a company that does not have an ADR program.
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Individual corporate governance ratings are from Credit Lyonnais South Asia (2001). We use the average rating for each firm and some of its subindices: management transparency, management discipline, and management independence.
Since our market value regression expands that in La Porta et al. (2002), we follow their steps in measuring Tobin's q and average sales growth for the four quarters in the sample, for which we use balance sheet data from Economatica. We define a proxy measure of q as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. 21 Figures A2 and A3 in the Appendix show that most firms release their quarterly accounting data before the eighth week into the next quarter, so we assume that the quarterly balance sheet data has been fully incorporated into market prices two months after the closing of the quarter. Therefore, our first quarterly measure of The market value of assets results from summing the book value of liabilities and the market value of equity. From an accounting identity, the book value of liabilities equals the book value of assets minus the book value of equity. This is used as a proxy for the market value of liabilities, which is not easily observable. Data on deferred taxes are unavailable for the firms in our sample, so we cannot replicate exactly the La Porta et al. (2002, p. 1158) definition of q. Our measure mimics that in Klapper et al. (2002) . 22 Economatica only reports the sum of total shares outstanding: the result of adding all classes of common shares with different voting rights and preferred shares. Given the inability to discriminate within the different classes of common and preferred shares and across both categories of stocks, in order to compute the market value of equity, paragraph) this measure of equity value is assessed from the point of view of outside shareholders, so it is from the perspective of investors who do not necessarily have access to the firm's control or inside information. To reduce the weight of outliers, we censor Tobin's q at the 5 th and 95 th percentiles, by setting extreme values to the 5 th and 95 th percentiles respectively.
To proxy for the value of growth opportunities, for each quarter and firm in the sample we compute the annual US dollar sales growth rate for the three years ending 11 months before the reading of the market value of equity. So, the first observation of the sales growth rate is an average of annual sales growth from January, 1999 , until December, 2002 , and that is matched with Tobin's q as of December 1, 2003. We actually use the geometric annual average growth rate from up to three years. 23 Again, we cap sales growth at the 5 th and 95 th percentiles to avoid problems with outliers.
The 288 tickers used in the rest of this study correspond to 207 unique firms, and the market value regression is ran at the firm (not at the ticker) level. After dropping firms with missing data, we are left with 175 firms which are the basis for this estimation.
Along with La Porta et al. (2002), we also run the market value regression expressing sales growth and q in deviation from the industry medians. Following their procedure, we take all firms in Economatica, excluding the 205 firms in our sample, and we compute q and average sales growth for the 1,135 remaining firms for which data are available.
24 These firms are from 19 different industries according to the Economatica classification, and all sectors have at least five remaining firms in them. We find the median q and average sales growth for each of the 19 sectors and so compute the industry-adjusted variables thereof for the firms in our sample. 25 The Brazilian stock with the smallest average ITP gauged 2.9 while that with the largest ITP gauged 76.2. This means that there was a we multiply the total number of shares by the price of the issue that was most heavily traded during the full sample period. Note that, for the majority of companies with liquid common and preferred shares to be included in the 288 ticker sample (all of them from Brazil), the traded volume of preferred shares exceeded that of common shares by a factor of between 10 and 40. The 288 tickers correspond to 207 corporations. Two were dropped for lack of data: Embratel (Brazil) and La Polar (Chile). 23 This computation and alignment procedure for sales growth and q mimics that in La Porta et al. (2002) . 24 Although we technically take both active and cancelled firms in Economatica, which total 1,135, in practice the cancelled firms lack data. The count of the active-firm subset was 815. 25 ITP figures in the tables in the text are reported in percentage points. For simplicity, we subsequently try to avoid repeating the word percent after each number.
Results
Distribution of Informed Trading Probability
76.2 chance that any randomly selected trade in that stock-quarter was initiated by a privately informed agent.
(TABLE 1.A ABOUT HERE)
The ranking of countries from lowest to highest median ITP is made of Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, and Colombia. One should be cautious about inferring that the degree of ITP across the universe of Colombian and Venezuelan firms is large given that we have only three stocks from each of those countries in the sample. The big picture from the top panel is that there is substantial heterogeneity of ITP across stocks, but that this variability occurs mainly within countries and not across them. For example, while the distribution of ITP for Brazil is shifted to the left relative to that of the other countries, the maximum ITP in the sample is also from Brazil.
For comparison, the last line of the top panel reports statistics based on the ITPs of American stocks estimated with data from 13 years before that in our sample by Easley et al. (1996a and 1996b) . Although the US distribution tends to be shifted to the left relative to that of the Latin American countries, the gap is much lower than we would have anticipated. This prior expectation is based on the relative degree of investor protection and enforcement of insider trading bans and on the evidence in Bhattacharya et al. (2000) that Mexican corporate announcement news have already been fully incorporated into prices by the time they are officially disclosed to the market. However, Easley et al. (1996b) and our Table 1 .B show that the distribution of ITP depends critically on the liquidity of each security, so that ignoring that dependence can significantly bias comparisons. Moreover, the substantial discrepancy in sample periods can underlie differences in the worldwide systematic component of α in (1). In general, an appropriate comparison of ITP across markets should be based on a matched sample of firms as in Easley et al. (1996b) . We leave this careful comparison for future research, but still report the US statistics to place our results in the context of the previous literature.
The second panel groups stocks by industrial sector. While communications has the lowest median ITP (14.6) and cyclical consumer products has the highest median ITP (19.9) there seems to be even lower variability in median ITP across industrial sectors than there is across countries. The third panel reports that preferred stocks have a much lower ITP than common stocks. Given that all preferreds in the sample are from Brazil, and that these make up three fourths of stocks from that country, this finding is related to the lower ITP of Brazilian stocks and will be addressed in detail in discussing Table 2 .A.
Assuming that the US Securities and Exchange Commission scrutinizes ADR transactions as well it does US domestic stocks, one can expect a higher punishment for trading with private information in the US relative to Latin American exchanges. Alternatively, if one assumes that firms listing ADRs are thereby signaling their commitment to better corporate governance practices, one could also expect a lower ITP for ADRs. The fourth panel of Table 1 .A shows that this is the case on average. ADRs and ADR underlying stocks have lower ITPs than stocks that just trade at home. In line with the results from other partitionings of the ITP set, we find that although ADRs have lower ITPs, these are also more disperse than for the other categories.
(TABLE 1.B ABOUT HERE) Table 1 .B looks at the distribution of ITP by volume quintiles, defined for each quarter. We use two measures of volume: quintiles defined relative to the amount of trading in each of the eight exchanges (intra-exchange quintiles), and quintiles defined relative to the amount of trading in all exchanges combined (inter-exchange quintiles). Whatever the measure, the findings confirm the finding of Easley et al. (1996b) for the US, that less liquid stocks are prone to substantially higher ITP: the figure for the lowest volume quintile (23 points) is about twice as large as that for the highest volume quintile (12 points). The econometric exercises below, show that volume is one of the most robust determinants of differences in ITP. But Table 1 .B shows that even this partitioning of the sample leaves much within group variance: the top 5 percent of stocks in the most liquid quintile have a higher ITP than the median stock from the lowest volume quintile.
Finally, Table 1 .C shows the that there is variation of ITP across quarters, and that that time pattern is different across the different categories (some are higher at the beginning, while others are higher near the end of the sample).
(TABLE 1.C ABOUT HERE)
The main message so far is that there is a substantial heterogeneity of ITP within categories commonly controlled for in the literature. This underscores the importance of computing company-specific proxies of governance quality as we do in this paper.
Cross-Sectional Determinants of Informed Trading
5.2.A. Categorical Decomposition of Informed Trading
We first attempt to identify categorical covariates of ITP using the pooled OLS regression, 
where every I(.) is a matrix of dummy variables for each classification. Since we include several sets of dummy variables, to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we depart from the standard procedure of reporting the results for each group as a difference relative to a control group. That is, we use dummies that span the full set of possibilities of a given partition of the sample, so that the coefficient on each dummy reflects to what extent behavior for that category deviates from the global average (Suits, 1984) . 26 The t-ratios assess whether the difference is statistically significant. 27 The coefficient on the global intercept is the mean of ITP for the average stock. Given the evidence in Tables 1.B and 1.C, we control for time fixed effects and for volume effects in all regressions. The first important result is that volume is inversely related to ITP: while ITP for the average stock is 21.6 (model 1), the estimate is 17.2 for the most liquid stocks, and it rises to about 26.8 for the least liquid stocks from the average country. The result is robust to the different specifications and is consistent with those in the received literature (e.g. Easley et al., 1996b, among others).
Model 1 also shows that Brazilian, Mexican, and Peruvian companies have a statistically significantly lower ITP than the average stock. The (few) firms from Venezuela and Colombia in the sample, instead, have systematically higher average ITPs, while Argentine, and Chilean companies' ITPs are not significantly different from the overall mean.
Model 2 analyzes economic sector effects and shows that the ITPs of financial and cyclical consumer products firms are higher than average, while communications firms have a lower ITP. 28 Model 3 shows that common stocks have higher ITPs than preferred stocks. The Brazilian coefficient in model 1 can be low because informed trading is not as prevalent there, or because 75 percent of Brazilian stocks in the sample are preferreds which are themselves characterized by low ITP as model 3 shows. Model 5 checks for this possibility by including all controls simultaneously.
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It may seem puzzling that the estimate for Brazil is 5 percentage points lower than that for Chile, while Chile scores better in several corporate governance quality measures. 30 Various authors argue that there is an extraordinary concentration of voting power in Brazilian companies, represented in common shares that are usually not traded in public stock markets, while 90 percent of what is traded there are non-voting or preferred shares that do not pay material dividends (Leal et al., 2005 , Carvalho, 2000 . If this is true, the value of such "preferred" shares may be disentangled from corporate outcomes. Insiders may therefore not participate in public markets, and potentially chose to profit from their informational advantage 26 When using a control group, one imposes the constraint that the coefficient on that group's dummy is zero. Here we impose that the sum of the coefficients of all group dummies is zero. The problem is mathematically identical, but the results are easier to interpret in this way, especially when more than one set of dummy variables is used. The test that all the coefficients on the dummies are jointly equal to zero is a test of equality of the group means. 27 Given the strong indication from Tables 1.A and 1.B that the volatility of ITP differs substantially across groups of stocks, we use White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 28 One possible justification for these results is that it is harder for outsiders to properly assess the value financial firms (whose expertise is precisely the handling of critical information about their borrowers) as opposed to heavily regulated communications firms. 29 The industrial sector effects are jointly insignificant in the combined regression and so are dropped in model 5. (Lefort and Walker, 2005) . Moreover, about 15 percent of issued stocks are actively traded in the local market, whereas about 8 percent of such stocks are kept in custody for depositary receipts traded in foreign markets. These numbers suggest that, for Chilean companies, a much higher proportion of the voting power is traded in public stock markets, compared to Brazilian firms. Then, it may be perfectly possible that insiders from Chilean firms trade in public stock markets more actively than in the Brazilian case.
Our country ranking differs from that of Grishchenko et al. (2002) as they find that Brazil and Argentina have much higher prevalence of informed trading than Chile. This contrast may result from the difference in the sample periods and from the alternative methods used to infer informed trading. Note, however, that although they document a positive relation between return autocorrelation and volume, which can be interpreted as evidence of informed trading, they do not perform the test in Llorente et al. (2002) to show that the correlation coefficient effectively depends on informed trading measures. Our approach is more direct, since the ITP is directly the probability that each trade comes from an informed trader.
Another very important result from Table 2 .A is that the gap between ADRs and stocks that just trade at home is a significant amount (2.7 percentage points), relative to an overall ITP average of about 21.1. This is consistent both with the hypothesis of better enforcement of insider trading rules in the US and with the signaling hypothesis discussed above, and it also confirms the results in Von Furstenberg and Tabora (2004) . These authors use price data for Telmex and Televisa stocks trading both at the Bolsa de Mexico and in New York as ADRs. They find that price discovery mainly takes place in Mexico, which conforms to a higher presence of informed traders in the home market. In model 5, we find that ADRs have an average ITP that is 1.3 points lower than that of their underlying securities.
5.2.B. Informed Trading and Corporate Governance Measures Used in the Literature
We next analyze the dependence between privately informed trading and governance quality variables used in the literature. The maintained hypothesis is that our measure contains more information than previously used metrics. 31 One caveat to this explanation is that the Brazil effect in model 5 is much stronger than the Preferred effect. One possibility for this result is that the common Brazilian shares, representing a negligible fraction of voting power, are also not the means of choice of insiders to trade on information.
with one Governance Quality ij variable at a time, including volume quintile and time dummies, and using exchange-stock random effects. In most cases, Governance Quality ij uses only the country subscript (j) since it is a nationwide measure. So we only have seven effective observations of the quality variable in those regressions and thus the results should be interpreted with care. 32 We include the individual corporation subscript (i) because four lines in the table use the individual corporation ratings from CLSA. 33 The first four columns of the table report the coefficients and standard errors using intra-exchange and inter-exchange volume quintiles respectively. The last two columns report the effect on ITP of either a one standard deviation increase in Governance Quality ij or a change in it from zero to one when it is binary. For most explanatory variables, a higher value implies a better investor protection or corporate governance environment (e.g. a higher value of Risk of Expropriation index means less risk). The exceptions are Percentage of Share Capital to Call an Extraordinary Shareholders' Meeting (a higher value means that it is more difficult for minorities to accomplish this), the Median Shares of the Three Largest Shareholders (a higher value implies more concentrated ownership), and Mandatory Dividend (the fraction of net income that a corporation is forced to pay out as dividends, which may be ambiguous for governance quality). To facilitate interpretation, we report regression results ranked from the lowest to the highest coefficients. Table A7 shows that Brazil is at the top of the concentration scale while Chile is at the bottom --in fact the latter is about two standard deviations below the sample mean. 32 We use all pertinent variables in La Porta et al. (1998) Table A6 in the Appendix defines  the country-wide variables, while Table A7 shows the observations by country. 33 These are management transparency, management discipline, management independence, and the average rating. 34 These two variables are statistically significant only when using intra-exchange volume quintiles.
The sign change of the coefficients on Rule of Law and Corruption between their 1998 and their 2004 observations merits an explanation. Table A7 shows that Brazil was about one half a standard deviation above the cross country mean in 1998 and it went down to about one half a standard deviation below the mean in 2004 in both of these variables. This fact, given that Brazil has the lowest mean ITP in the sample, helps explain the sign reversal of these variables in equation (5). As noted above, this is essentially a regression with seven observations in the Governance Quality j dimension, so this big reversal in the score of Brazil can cause the unexpected sign change.
The findings of Grishchenko et al. (2002) and ours agree on some important points, but they also disagree on others. On the one hand, the enforcement of insider trading bans, better accounting standards and less risk of expropriation, and the existence of One Share-One Vote legislation imply less prevalence of asymmetric information trading in both papers. There are also some counterintuitive results that coincide: existence of Cumulative Voting or Proportional Representation rules imply higher informed trading intensity in both papers.
On the other hand, the effect of Percentage of Shares needed to call an Extraordinary Meeting has a counterintuitive effect in Grishchenko et al. (2002) while we find no effect on ITP. On the other hand, countries with more concentrated ownership structures have asymmetric information trading according to Grishchenko et al. (2002) while they have a lower ITP in our exercise. Of course, this comparison is limited by the fact that, having 19 countries in their sample, they have more degrees of freedom to identify the effect of country-wide variables than we do.
Although the regressions involving CLSA ratings are exempt from the degrees of freedom problem that pervades those using nationwide controls, using those variables gives mixed results. Management Independence and Average rating from CLSA have the "wrong" sign in at least one of the specifications though, as mentioned above, Management Transparency did have the right sign in one of the specifications.
In summary, while some of the often used measures of corporate governance quality are associated with informed trading probabilities, in general, there seems be an important degree of heterogeneity in ITP that is not captured by the variables used in the literature.
Event Study: Informed Trading Probability Around Corporate Announcements
In the time series dimension, inside information is most valuable just prior to its public release. We next run an event study attempting to analyze if ITP indeed rises during the 20 trading days before a public announcement relative to a control and a post-announcement period. We further assess if this time pattern differs across categories (e.g. volume quintiles, countries, industries, common/preferred, and ADR status). As usual in these types of experiments, this is a test of the joint hypothesis that ITP is a good measure of insider trading and that insiders do take advantage of their privileged access to information. Having computed ITP for the three periods around each announcement, we estimate the following equation, where K i is the number of announcements for firm i during the sample, and t indicates calendar time measured in days.
35 I it represents an indicator function that equals 1 when day t during which the ITP of the kth announcement of stock i is estimated corresponds to I's superscript.
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In some cases, two announcements of a given firm are not sufficiently spaced apart so that the data for a given day are used to estimate two different ITPs. For example, if there are less than 40 trading days between two consecutive announcements, some days will fall in the postannouncement period relative to the first statement and in the pre-announcement period relative the second. Therefore the underlying ITP-generating process will be affected by these confounding effects. In order to handle this problem, we multiply each of the three ITPs pertaining to each announcement by a 20 by 1 unit vector, where each entry pertains to the calendar day from which the number of buys, sells, and no-trade periods are taken to estimate that ITP. This is why the dependent variable in (6) has 60 different values of the t subscript for the kth announcement of firm i. On the right-hand side of the regression, we take care of the potentially different data generating processes by turning on both indicator functions since day t falls in the range that activates I POST relative to the first announcement and I PRE relative to the second announcement. Moreover, there will be two observations for that day t. In one of them the dependent variable will be the ITP of the post-announcement period relative to the first statement, while on the other one the dependent variable will be the ITP of the preannouncement period relative to the second announcement. We think that this procedure addresses the potentially confounding information in the data generating process without resorting to dropping announcements. Whenever announcements by a firm are spaced more than 40 days apart only one indicator function will be turned on for each day. Table 3 reports the results of estimating (6). Note that we do not use a specific dummy for the control period. Thus 0 α reflects the mean value of ITP during the control period, and all other coefficients in the table report the incremental value of ITP either during a pre-or a postannouncement period or for stocks in a specific category or both. The coefficients on the top row show the behavior of the average stock, so that ITP has a benchmark value of 19.8 during the control period. During the pre-periodic announcement period, this rises by 0.8 points (this increase being statistically significant). In the post-periodic announcement period, ITP is 0.2 points higher than during the control period, but this difference is not statistically significant. So, the point estimates indicate that ITP goes from 19.8 to 20.6 and back to 20 around periodic announcements, just as if informed parties were speculating with private information prior to its public release. The evidence is not as compelling for aperiodic announcements, though the ITP falls by a statistically significant amount after the announcement. This indicates that there is more informed trading during the 40 days prior to an announcement than after it. If the true window width were greater than 20 days, this could imply that there is speculative trading prior to these aperiodic announcements also.
While Table 3 reports the incremental coefficients of a category or announcement type relative to the control period, to facilitate interpretation, Figures 2.A-2.E report the total ITP during each period for each category. Each figure has four graphs. Those on the left correspond to periodic announcements and those on the right correspond to aperiodic ones. Graphs at the top of each figure are based on an unreported regression where the only dummies included in Z i are the volume quintiles and at most the set of dummies for one other classification at a time (e.g. 2.A focuses on volume alone, 2.B focuses on volume and countries, 2.C on volume and industries, etc.). Graphs at the bottom of each figure report the results of adding the coefficients from Table 3 , so they measure partial effects of a given category when Z i includes dummies for all classifications simultaneously. For example, the first three bars (average stock) in the two bottom charts of Figure 2 .A report the average ITP during each event window for the average stock from Table 3 that was discussed in the previous paragraph.
(FIGURES 2.A THROUGH 2.E ABOUT HERE OR SPREAD FROM UNTIL THE END OF SECTION 5.3)
Seen from a different angle, the top graphs correspond to a different investment strategy than those at the bottom. The periodic announcement graphs of Figure 2 .B serve to illustrate the point. If one buys an Argentine or Chilean equally-weighted liquid stock portfolio, one is subject to the evolution of ITP shown in the top graph. In particular, ITP does not seem to peak in the preannouncement period. But stocks from these two countries will be different in more dimensions than just country of domicile: for example there are more non-cyclical consumer product companies and there are fewer energy companies in the Chilean sample than in its Argentine counterpart (see Table A2 in the Appendix for a breakdown). The relative importance of stocks that just trade at home is also different. The bottom graphs show the pure country partial effect (that is, purged from the influence of these other variables). It reflects the results of a strategy that is long in the country in question and short in the different components of that portfolio that are different from the average stock in the sample of the four countries considered. When focusing on the pure country effect, the bottom charts show that there is substantial private information speculation in the pre-announcement period in both countries, something that is hidden by other factors in the top graphs.
For expository simplicity we focus the discussion on the bottom charts of Figures 2.A-2.E. Interested readers can check those results with the coefficients from Table 3 on which these graphs are based.
The bottom panels of Figure 2 .A confirm that periodic announcements are subject to private information trading in all quintiles but the third. For aperiodic announcements, only stocks in the two lowest quintiles are subject to speculative trading.
The bottom row of Figure 2 .B shows that Chilean stocks are subject to information-based trading before both types of announcements, while Argentine stocks suffer the same problem before periodic announcements. Mexican stocks (and Argentine stocks prior to aperiodic announcements) have the peculiar pattern that ITP peaks in the control period and falls thereafter. If the true window length were longer than 20 days this could also indicate speculative trading there. There is no evidence of information-based trading in Brazil. The Chilean vs. Brazilian patterns are fully consistent with the findings of Table 2.A discussed above.
Speculative trading prior to public announcements also seems to differ across industrial sectors. Communications, non-cyclical consumer products, diversified, and the industrial sector proper have the hump-shaped pattern peaking in the pre-periodic announcement period.
39 Noncyclical consumer products, energy and utilities replicate the pattern for aperiodic announcements.
The bottom row of Figure 2 .D shows that there seems to be more speculative trading in preferred than in common stocks, a feature that is not fully consistent with our explanation of the preferred effect in the discussion of Table 2 .A. We lack a coherent explanation for this figure.
The bottom charts of Figure 2 .E are also very telling. Information-based trading of periodic announcements seems to focus on stocks that only trade at home, and on stocks that are not ADR underlying securities although their issuers have ADR programs. The picture is very different for mergers and acquisitions, in which ITP seems substantially higher before than after the announcements, and this is particularly so for stocks of companies with ADR programs. Unfortunately, the evidence in Von Furstenberg et al. (2004) does not allow us to tell if the price discovery that takes place locally (which we confirm to be the case in general and for periodic announcements) switches to New York just before aperiodic announcements are released as documented here.
Two reasons may underlie the lack of speculative trading of aperiodic announcements for stocks that just trade at home. On the one hand, it may be the case that firms without ADR programs release low quality information regarding these announcements, and so analyst-based privately informed traders may become more active after such a release. On the other hand, only 25 out of the 163 aperiodic announcements were released by companies that just trade at home. Perhaps the sample is too small to draw any useful inferences.
As a robustness check, we perform the same exercise using a window length of only 10 trading days. Table A9 and Figures A4.A through A4 .E in the Appendix show the counterpart results of those in Table 3 and Figures 2.A through 2.E. The graphs tend to confirm the finding of the benchmark experiment that ITP is higher before announcements than after them. This is reflected in the first three bars of each graph which show the situation of the average stock. However, in many cases in this experiment, the total ITP is higher during the control than during the pre-announcement period. On the assumption that ITP correctly measures true informed trading, we interpret this as evidence that the specified window length is shorter than the true window length. This is because during the control period, we should observe informed trading that is at most as high as during the pre-announcement period. If there is privately informed trading, it should be lower, if there is not privately informed trading, it should be just as high.
The results indicate that in many cases, ITP is highest in the control period. The case ADRs during aperiodic announcements illustrates the point (bottom right-hand side graphs of Figures 2.E and A4.E): with the 20-day window width, ITP has the expected hump in the middle, while it is always decreasing with the 10-day window width. We attribute the latter result to window misspecification. Further evidence that a 10-trading day window width is too short is the fact that both Vega (2004) and Aktas et al. (2004) use event windows that are at least 40 trading days. Given that we only have 250 trading days of data and one announcement every 53 trading days on average, we chose not to use a window width that is longer than 20 days.
In summary: the event study set to analyze if the time pattern of ITP around material corporate announcements was consistent with the hypothesis that privately informed parties exploit this information when it is most valuable. We decomposed ITP during these three periods and found notable differences across volume ranges, countries, industrial sectors, and ADR status of the securities in question. The overall evidence is consistent with our hypothesis.
The Market Value of Informed Trading
So far, we have documented that there is substantial heterogeneity of ITP both within and between categories that have been controlled for in regression analysis. To complete the previous findings, we now assess whether the market does indeed recognize both this heterogeneity and that informed trading is harmful to outside investors as reflected in the prices of the securities that those investors trade. La Porta et al. (2002) focus on nationwide controls and on corporationspecific cash-flow rights measured at one point in time. Klapper et al. (2002) use corporation specific measures of governance that are analyst-based (and so potentially subjective and endogenous), and are also fixed over time. Our contribution is to postulate the ITP measured during each quarter in the sample as a corporate governance quality indicator at the firm-quarter level. where Tobin's q ijt proxies for the value of the firm i in country j during quarter t, and Sales Growth ijt attempts to capture the value of the firm's growth opportunities. We run several regressions using all the governance quality or investor protection variables used in Table 2 .B, both alone and interacted with ITP, with time fixed effects. Very few of these variables turned out to be significant so the tables focus on those cases in which they were significant. Following La Porta et al. (2002), Table 4 .A presents the results using raw data while, for robustness, Table  4 .B uses q and Sales Growth in deviation from industrial sector medians. The bottom line of each table reports the percentage rise in Tobin's q that accompanies a one standard deviation fall in ITP.
The key result is that ITP has a negative contemporaneous effect on market value in all specifications: a one standard deviation fall in ITP is accompanied by a rise in Tobin's q of between 0.99 and 2.11 percentage points depending on the model. The effect is significant economically and statistically at the 10 percent level in most specifications, and it is slightly stronger with industry-adjusted data.
The two first columns of each table report the benchmark specifications, in which ITP is used alongside Sales Growth and a constant. 40 The first column uses firm fixed effects while the second one uses country random effects. In three of the four cases, ITP is significant at the 10 percent level.
The regressions in the last three columns use governance quality variables that are fixed over time. Therefore, fixed effects are not feasible and we use random effects. When using Rule of Law and Legality (both assessed during 2004) the ITP coefficients are in the ballpark of the benchmark specifications and are statistically significant in three out of the four cases. Therefore, informed trading probability is priced above and beyond the measures of nationwide investor protection in this seven-country sample.
The last column of each table reports the results of a regression using the CLSA average rating for each corporation. We only have these data for 60 firms out of the 175 used in the previous regression. Although the point estimate of the coefficient on ITP remains negative, it is no longer statistically significant. A similar result obtains using other CLSA measures of governance quality. This may result in part from the correlation between the average rating and ITP documented in Table 2 .B, a fact that has interesting policy implications discussed in the next section.
Klapper and Love (2002) also regress Tobin's q on CLSA governance ratings and find a coefficient between 0.02 and 0.025, quite similar to our own point estimates of 0.03 and 0.027.
Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Directions for Future Research
For all practical purposes, illegal insider trading goes unpunished in Latin America. The theme of this paper is that, given the unobservability of illegal insider trading from the viewpoint of outside investors, its detrimental effect on minority shareholders' returns, and the history of impunity of this fraud in Latin America, controlling groups actually choose by how much they will exploit their informational advantage in securities trading. Therefore corporate governance and insider trading are intimately related.
While controlling group discretionary powers could hurt minority shareholders, they could also benefit them. For instance, a more powerful controlling group may internalize benefits of monitoring that are beneficial to all shareholders. However, insider trading is an explicit use of the discretion option that is harmful to outside investors. Nationwide regulations that permit this discretion give controlling groups options to harm. Insider trading proxies indicate to what extent controlling groups actually exercise these options at the expense of outsiders.
We use a well established method to estimate the probability of informed trading (ITP) for each of 288 Latin American stocks. We analyze its behavior in the cross-section and around corporate announcements, and we assess whether the market prices this risk. One caveat to all of our findings is that ITP estimates privately informed trading, which is more general and not necessarily restricted to illegal insider trading.
We find that there is substantial heterogeneity of ITP across stocks and that this dispersion occurs mainly within groups (such as countries, volume quintiles, industrial sectors, security types, and ADR classifications) and not between them. The new information that we generate may thus be valuable in assessing individual corporate behavior, which we show that is not easily captured by groupings usually controlled for in the literature.
In spite of this, we are able to estimate the effects of some control variables: ITP varies greatly across volume categories, with the least liquid stocks having about twice the median rate (20 percent) of the most liquid stocks (11 percent). Brazil and Mexico have lower mean ITP, while Colombia and Venezuela have higher mean ITP than the average stock. The stocks of firms with ADR programs have less ITP than those without, just like preferred stocks have lower amounts than common stocks. Also, countries with better information-related investor protection legal variables tend to have lower ITP.
We next analyze whether ITP rises just before material corporate announcements are disclosed to the market, and find that this is true in general, although the magnitude and the lead of the anticipation seems higher for acquisition and divestiture (aperiodic) announcements than for earnings and cash-dividend (periodic) announcements. While ADRs have low information leakage relative to periodic announcements, they seem to have substantial leakage relative to aperiodic ones. We find tangible information leakage in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, but no evidence thereof in Brazil. Some industrial sectors are subject to significant spikes of ITP just before public announcements --a fact that might interest investors.
Last, we check whether the market value of firms responds to changes in ITP, and find that a fall of one standard deviation in this variable raises corporate value by about one to two percentage points. This pricing seems low compared with the expected loss to an outsider from trading with a privately informed agent. We attribute this gap to the fact that the market may not be sufficiently aware of the distribution of informational asymmetries among the different stocks.
We conclude that Informed Trading Probability does indeed proxy for unobservable corporate governance quality and that there is substantial heterogeneity of firm behavior within a given institutional environment. Part of this heterogeneity seems to be recognized by the market and priced accordingly.
Our findings have important policy implications. While the received literature emphasizes the benefits of macro (legal) reforms, this paper shows that the micro components of our corporate governance measure are far from trivial. From the traditional adverse selection literature (e.g. Leland and Pyle, 1977) we know that, with asymmetric information, the absence of signaling technologies induces uninformed investors to charge higher financing rates to all firms, precluding funding for some otherwise profitable projects. Moreover, a signal variable may be sufficient for investors to correctly discriminate across firms and projects, restoring the Pareto-efficiency of the market equilibrium. We propose to create a corporate integrity score to fill the role of such a signal variable. By publicly disclosing the score of different companies, we would rely on spontaneous market separation mechanisms to improve on the corporate investment funding role of public securities markets.
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Although ITP would be an ingredient of this score, other asymmetric-information measures such as the bid-ask spread, its adverse selection component, or the price impact of trades, etc. should also be contemplated. Moreover, one could conduct the same event study of ITP around corporate announcements that we do but using two or three years of data and compute the mean increase of ITP during the pre-announcement period for each individual corporation. Furthermore, it would be interesting to counterpart these trade-and offer-based data with price impact of announcements data. While Bhattacharya et al. (2000) show that Mexican stock prices are on average unresponsive to corporate announcements, we surmise that the distribution of these responses is heterogeneous within countries, just like the distribution of ITP.
Because controlling groups may evolve over time in the management of inside information, in part due to the pressure caused by the integrity score, the latter could be updated once or twice a year to reflect this change in behavior.
These measures have the advantage of being objective, quantitative, theory-based proxies of corporate behavior. They are also less expensive to compute than the alternative, analyst-based measures which are potentially subjective and endogenous.
This score might provide palpable benefits by encouraging investor interest in those companies that are making a real effort to improve the quality and access to information. Moreover, it would induce companies that have problems with inside information management to be more proactive in this area. For example, in choosing a target for a merger or an acquisition, a company may care to know how likely it is that the partner will begin trading (illegally) in the public market to tilt the negotiation in his favor before the deal is completed. Also, multilateral financial organizations could screen companies on this score when accepting them as contractors for investment projects that they help fund. But, before this happens, more research is clearly needed to asses the specific construction and robustness of this proposed individual corporation integrity score.
Figure 1: The Probability Structure of Trade
This figure shows the tree diagram of the trading process. α is the probability of new information (a signal) occurring. Conditional on the appearance of new information, δ denotes the probability of a bad signal. Given any signal, µ is the probability that nature chooses an informed trader to trade. If nature chooses an uninformed trader, the latter trades with probability ε. Given that an uninformed trader trades, she sells with probability ρ and buys with probability (1-ρ). Nodes to the left of the vertical 'Trade Opens' line occur only at the beginning of the trading day, while nodes to the right occur in every possible trading period within the day. As an example, the rightmost column computes the probability, for a given trading day, of observing 4 sells, 5 buys, and 1 no trade period, conditional on the existence and type of signal at each trade-opening node. The likelihood for that day is equation (1) 
Figure 2.A: Informed Trading Probability Around Corporate Announcements by Volume Quintiles
Figures 2.A through 2.E show the mean total informed trading probability estimated in the event study (for the control, pre-announcement, and post-announcement periods) for stocks in different categories. Each figure contains four graphs. Graphs on the left correspond to periodic announcements (earnings and cash dividends), while those on the right pertain to aperiodic announcements (acquisitions and divestitures). Graphs at the top correspond to OLS regressions that only control for volume beside the category analyzed in the graph. Graphs at the bottom report the total estimated ITP for stocks in the indicated category but resulting from regressions that control for other categories not explicitly depicted in the graph (they result from adding the coefficients in Table 3 ). So the ITP in the bottom graphs is purged of factors other than the one being explicitly shown, that could also have affected the ITP of the stocks shown in the top graph. et al. (1996a and 1996b) . ADRs were classified as common or preferred stock based on the relevant category for their underlying securities. In the ADR classification (bottom panel) a ticker can either be an ADR, an ADR underlying security, the stock of a company that has an ADR program, although this is not the underlying stock, or the stock of a company that only trades at home. The figures show that ITP are fairly diverse within countries, industrial sectors, and security types. 
This table shows the output of pooled OLS regressions controlling for time fixed effects. The dependent variable is the informed trading probability for each ticker times 100. Dummies are used for each and every possible category within a classification, so the coefficient on a dummy shows how different is the average stock in that category from the overall average stock (Suits, 1984) . See note to Table 1 .A for details on the security type and ADR classifications. Volume quintiles are defined by exchange-quarter (intra-exchange classification). The industry effects are dropped in model 5 for they are jointly insignificant. The time fixed effects are jointly significant in all specifications and are not reported. White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. This table shows the output of panel regressions using exchange-ticker random effects and controlling for time and volume fixed-effects. The first two columns use intra-exchange volume quintiles, while the second two columns use inter-exchange quintiles. Each line corresponds to a regression that uses only that investor protection variable. All variables except the CLSA individual corporation (i) ratings are fixed within a country (j). See appendix Table A5 for a definition of the explanatory variables and their sample moments. For most explanatory variables, a higher value implies a better investor protection or corporate governance environment (e.g. a higher value of Risk of Expropriation index means less risk). The exceptions are: percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting (a higher value means that it is more difficult for minorities to accomplish this), the median shares of the three largest shareholders (a higher value implies more ownership concentration), and mandatory dividend (the fraction of net income that a corporation is forced to pay out as dividends, which may be ambiguous for governance quality). The last two columns report the effect on 100 times ITP of either a one standard deviation rise in the explanatory variable or, if it is binary, the effect of it changing from 0 to 1. The time fixed effects are jointly significant in all specifications and are not reported. Likewise for the volume effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis beside each coefficient. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. This table shows the results of an event study analyzing the behavior of informed trading probability (ITP) around corporate announcements controlling for volume, country, industrial sector, security type, and ADR status of each stock. The dependent variable is ITP (in percentage points) estimated during a control, a pre-announcement and a post-announcement period relative to each announcement date. Each estimation period is 20 trading-days long. I it is an indicator function that equals 1 on those days t (whose data are used to compute the ITP of the kth announcement of stock i) that fall in the range of I's superscript. Periodic announcements comprise earnings and cash dividends news, while aperiodic ones consist of acquisitions and divestiture reports. The top row reports the intercept coefficients: α 0 is the average ITP during the control period, β 0 shows how different is ITP during the pre-periodic announcement period relative to the control period, γ 0 shows the gap between ITP during post-periodic announcement days and control days, etc. The vector Z i contains dummies for each and every possible category within a classification. So, in each column of the table, the coefficient on each line shows how different is the behavior of the average stock in that category from that of the overall average stock during the corresponding event period (Suits, 1984) . The model is estimated by OLS, so the mean ITP during the sample of a top-volume Argentinean common stock from the non-cyclical consumer sector that just trades at home was 15.8 during the control period, it rose to 17.7 before a periodic announcement and it fell back to 15.5 after the announcement. We use the universe of announcements made between November 26, 2003, and September 8, 2004 , as recorded in Bloomberg --a total of 1,247 announcements from 264 stocks. Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru are excluded to avoid small sample bias. Standard errors are in parenthesis, * indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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